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S
afeguarding financial intermediation in the
economy and protecting taxpayers are two
cornerstones of financial stability policy. Both
objectives intersect when it comes to systemi-
cally important financial institutions or “SIFIs”
for short. These institutions’ size, interconnect-
edness, complexity, lack of substitutability and/
or global scope may lead market participants to
take government support for granted. This can
cause negative externalities, leading to more risk-
taking, reduced market discipline and competi-
tive distortions. Furthermore, an unexpected
denial of a bailout can have grave consequences.
Thus, the regulatory framework must make 
a SIFI’s failure a credible option, i. e. it must
undermine market participants’ widely held
belief that SIFIs are “too big to fail”. Simul  ta  -
neously, regulators need to enhance the
resilience of SIFIs, reducing both the probability
and the impact of a possible failure.
To increase their loss absorbency capacity, indi  -
vidual SIFIs will be required, starting in 2016,
to hold additional capital in accordance with
their systemic importance. The buffer will be
initially set at between 1.0 and 2.5 percentage
points. While currently only banks are the focus
of the SIFI surcharge, other systemically rele-
vant institutions will have to be covered, includ-
ing financial institutions of domestic relevance,
financial market infrastructures, insurance
companies and other non-bank financial insti-
tutions.
Tackling the implicit government guarantee
is at the heart of a solution to the SIFI prob-
lem. Therefore, special resolution regimes
for the financial sector are important tools
to enhance systemic stability. They enable
regulators to force ailing financial institu-
tions to be restructured or resolved, irre-
spective of their size. Progress in this regard
has already been made, both at the interna-
tional and national level. The Financial
Stability Board has proposed key attributes
for resolution regimes, which have been
endorsed at the G20 level as a new interna-
tional standard. 
German lawmakers acted quickly following the
financial crisis: the Restructuring Act adopted
in 2011 has established a procedure for the
restructuring of banks under private law while,
at the same time, strengthening the rights of
the German financial services regulator, BaFin,
which now has comprehensive powers to re  -
st  ructure and resolve banks. The act additionally
requires the banking sector to contribute to a
Restructuring Fund in order to help bear the
costs of stabilizing the financial system. This
framework is a new and promising approach
to the SIFI problem, but it will still have to
prove its effectiveness. Nevertheless, Germany
is setting a good example in this regard on an
international level. 
National resolution regimes, however, pre  sently
cannot fully cope with globally operating SIFIs.
These regimes, therefore, need to be compatible
with one another in order to enable cross-
border bank resolutions. At the European
level, the European Commission will soon
publish draft legislation on an EU resolution
framework and thus ensure a harmonized
implementation across Europe. The ongoing
regulatory initiatives are a major step in 
the right direction. However, more progress
toward internationally consistent solutions
still needs to be made, since solving the SIFI
problem constitutes the litmus test of the
inter  national reform agenda. We at the
Bundesbank will continue pushing for “bet-
ter” macroprudential regulation at the inter-
national level.
REGULATING SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
IS VITALLY IMPORTANT
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he subprime crisis in the US and the
ongoing fiscal crisis in Europe high-
light the importance of documenting and
understanding differences in the financial
behavior of households across the Atlantic
and within Europe. Are asset or debt levels
different mainly because of differences in
population characteristics or in market
conditions that affect the behavior of simi  -
lar households across countries? In the lat-
ter case, there is more scope for institu-
tional harmonization, policy and process
coordination of the type currently envis-
aged in the European policy debate. 
Our paper, forthcoming in the Review of
Economics and Statistics, uses newly available
micro data on older households (aged 50 and
above) from the US, 11 European countries, and
England, to document some surprising differ-
ences in household wealth levels and composi-
tion across countries. In addition, we use
advanced counterfactual analysis techniques to
show that such differences mostly arise from the
behavior of similar people in different economic
environments. We combine three micro-level
data sets sharing a common design: the US
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), and the
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE). 
The table documents net household wealth
levels and participation rates in stocks, home-
ownership, and mortgages, as well as holdings
at the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentile of the dis-
tribution of the asset or debt in question.
1
“Stocks” are those held, directly or indirectly,
in mutual funds and retirement accounts.
2
“Home” and “Mortgage” refer to primary resi-
dence. All amounts are in thousands of (2004)
dollars, adjusted for differences in the pur-
chasing power of money across countries.
The first panel shows net wealth levels, i. e. the
total value of financial and real assets net of all
debts, collateralized and uncollateralized, at dif-
ferent percentiles. Mainly because of more
widespread homeownership, households in fis-
cally troubled countries (Greece, Italy and
Spain) had, prior to the fiscal crisis, higher net
wealth levels at the lower end and at the medi-
an of the distribution than households in
Germany as well as, on average, those in the
other European countries considered. This sug-
gests a limited potential for using liquid wealth
to smooth the consequences of protracted
unemployment spells, wage cuts, and tax
increases.
POTENTIAL FOR HARMONIZATION
Participation in each asset and debt category is
more limited on average in Europe than in the
US, but with substantial variation. Except for
Sweden, the home is the asset most typically
held. Close to 40% of older US households
were carrying mortgage debt prior to the sub-
prime crisis, almost three times the European
average. Within Europe, stockholding participa-
tion ranges from above 70% in Sweden to 10%
in Austria; and homeownership from 87% in
Spain to roughly 50% in Germany. Belgium,
Spain and Greece have higher homeownership
rates than the US, but very few older southern
Europeans have mortgages. Dutch, Swedish
and Swiss older households exhibit even
greater participation than those in the US in the
period leading up to the subprime crisis.
INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO DIFFERENCES:
ENVIRONMENT VERSUS CHARACTERISTICS
4
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Dimitris Christelis
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Dimitris Georgarakos
Goethe University
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1 The paper also reports data on private businesses.
2 Stocks held in occupational defined-contribution pension plans are excluded, as data are not available across our countries.
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participation rates (or in the levels of holdings)
do not necessarily imply differences in eco-
nomic environment. To draw an analogy to
the labor literature, finding that the wages of
one group are on average below those of
another group is not sufficient to establish dis-
crimination: the relevant characteristics of the
underlying populations also need to be con-
trolled for. The paper introduces to household
finance the counterfactual analysis employed
in the labor literature. It controls for popula-
tion differences (as regards age structure, mari  -
tal status and number of children), health
(objective and subjective), and relevant atti-
tudes (such as the tendency for bequests or
social interactions). 
Our findings suggest that international differ-
ences in owner characteristics are not the
main drivers of measured differences in asset
and mortgage holdings, often pointing in the
opposite direction from the patterns found in
the data. In contrast, differences in economic
environment dictate observed differences and
are more pronounced among European coun-
tries than among US regions, suggesting con-
siderable potential for further harmonization.
In most European countries considered,
households are less likely to participate in
stocks than their US counterparts with simi-
lar characteristics. Exceptions are Sweden,
Denmark, and France. Retirement systems
play an important role in the first two, over-
coming the fact that the US has the lowest
transactions costs, the highest spending on
information and communications technolo-
gy, and the greatest level of stockholder pro-
tection. 
EUROPE IS MORE DIVERSE THAN THE US
US stockholders hold greater amounts of
stocks across the distribution of stockholdings
compared with any European country. With
the exception of Sweden, Switzerland and (to
some extent) Spain, this difference is mainly
attributable to differences in market condi-
tions affecting the behavior of similar people
across countries. Differences between the US
and European countries tend to be larger
when we focus on homeowners, consistent
with the view that Europeans regard the home
as a partial substitute for stocks.
European homeowners typically invest larger real
amounts in their home than US homeowners:
only in Sweden, Greece, Denmark and Spain are
for higher quantiles the amounts smaller. Ho  we  -
ver, controlling for characteristics, only Swedish
hou  seholds tend to invest significantly less in the
home than their US counterparts. To be sure, US
homeowners have larger homes on average,
while Europeans face higher real estate prices. 
This European tendency is not associated with
greater mortgage availability. Prior to the crisis,
mortgages were substantially larger in the US
than in practically any European country con-
sidered. US households were more exposed to
the risk of negative home equity in 2004/5 than
European ones sharing similar characteristics:
they tended to both own less expensive homes
and hold larger outstanding mortgages. 
Finally, we find telling results on the limited
extent to which economic environments are
harmonized within Europe, with Germany as
the base case, at least regarding aspects relevant
for asset and debt behavior. The striking differ-
ences in holdings within Europe, even after
controlling for characteristics, are not matched
by differences across US regions. This indicates
further potential for harmonization of econom-
ic environments across European countries.
The full article is available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ct_id=1963894
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Table 1: Ownership rates and amounts by quartiles
Country/ 
Region
Quantiles 
among owners Prevalence
(%)
United States
STOCKS
25 50 75
49.7
Quantiles 
among owners Prevalence
(%)
HOME
25 50 75
Quantiles 
among holders Prevalence
(%)
MORTGAGE
25 50 75
Quantiles 
NET WORTH
25 50 75
11.0 49.5 169.0 80.0 150.0 250.0 77.3 32.0 70.0 125.0 38.3 40.0 162.1 437.0
Midwest 54.5 10.0 45.0 150.2 82.0 132.0 200.0 80.9 30.0 65.0 105.0 39.3 52.0 178.2 428.1
Northeast 54.7 11.0 52.0 172.5 92.0 190.0 340.0 70.6 32.0 70.0 124.0 32.5 39.7 193.5 475.9
South 42.6 10.0 43.9 153.0 63.0 100.0 180.0 78.3 28.5 58.0 102.0 36.5 29.9 113.0 326.0
West 52.1 14.0 53.3 182.5 140.0 250.0 400.0 76.9 50.0 100.0 178.7 46.0 53.0 228.5 582.0
Europe 26.0 3.3 10.4 29.2 104.9 168.7 275.6 67.6 12.4 36.7 79.0 14.7 27.3 140.6 294.6
Sweden 70.8 3.8 12.1 34.5 51.2 92.1 153.5 68.9 15.2 30.7 57.0 40.2 21.5 86.4 201.1
Denmark 56.1 2.7 8.2 23.0 90.8 136.2 204.2 69.2 28.4 56.7 90.8 44.3 12.8 100.6 242.6
Germany 25.4 3.1 9.7 26.2 136.3 209.7 314.6 51.2 12.6 36.7 83.3 14.8 11.8 95.4 272.6
Netherlands 24.9 4.0 15.2 42.8 192.3 253.0 374.4 55.2 23.8 54.6 110.4 43.1 9.6 140.4 336.4
Belgium 37.7 5.1 20.3 70.7 127.4 173.6 254.8 80.0 5.2 14.4 32.7 11.9 96.6 199.4 370.0
France 43.0 2.8 8.0 26.6 124.1 186.2 310.4 72.2 7.9 23.7 51.7 11.9 49.4 177.1 348.9
Switzerland 36.3 7.2 25.6 80.5 229.5 317.4 459.1 54.8 51.0 104.6 201.3 45.3 35.5 193.4 414.4
Austria 10.2 3.1 8.1 27.4 108.0 162.0 270.0 56.7 1.9 10.8 43.2 9.2 9.4 112.5 244.5
Italy 10.4 4.7 14.3 32.9 95.4 168.7 281.2 75.1 9.6 27.0 56.2 5.6 46.4 149.5 297.2
Spain 12.8 4.0 11.0 24.6 84.1 131.3 219.7 86.9 9.5 30.2 58.6 9.7 73.2 140.7 254.1
Greece 10.6 1.1 4.3 12.4 62.0 95.5 148.9 84.3 5.0 18.6 37.2 5.5 55.8 111.7 215.6
England 39.4 4.6 15.6 52.1 191.5 275.7 398.3 76.1 10.7 27.6 63.3 16.8 75.7 257.4 443.3
Note: All amounts are in thousands of 2004 US Dollars, adjusted for purchasing power, unless otherwise indicated; 25, 50, 75
refer to percentiles of the distribution of holders. Computed using the 2004 waves of the US HRS, the UK ELSA, and the
European SHARE databases.
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n the course of the recent turmoil 
in the financial markets, several
open-end real estate funds (OREFs)
froze redemption of their units, result-
ing in unanticipated and unprecedented 
liquidity and performance shocks for
investors. Against this background, we
analyze the long- and short-term risk
and return profiles of open-end real
estate funds and their role in efficient
multi-asset retirement portfolios under
different liquidity regimes. To this end,
we introduce the Retirement Efficient
Frontier, describing those investment
strategies that minimize the lifetime
probability of ruin (LPoR) for specific
levels of periodic withdrawals from a
given retirement wealth. 
Open-end real estate funds are the predomi-
nant form of securitized real estate invest-
ment in Germany. These funds are regulated
collective investment schemes, which are
primarily invested in income-producing
commercial properties. By the end of 2009,
more than 87,000 million euros were invest-
ed in this fund category, almost 15% of 
total assets under management (AuM) in 
the German mutual fund industry. Usually,
they are characterized by a conservative risk
and return profile, i. e. they generate low but
stable re  turns (usually above inflation rates),
display low cor  relation to stock markets, and
exhibit high autocorrelation. Consequently,
these funds are predestined for moderately
to highly risk-averse investors. OREFs are
categorized as ‘open’ because the number of
issued fund units is not fixed, and fund units
can both be purchased and surrendered 
to the fund for redemption (normally) on a
daily basis at current net asset value prices.
Hence, OREFs try to offer a performance
closely linked to the relatively illiquid 
asset class of real estate combined with the
permanent redeemability of traditional
investment funds. This liquidity transfor-
mation, however, makes OREFs vulnerable
to shocks in liquidity demand due to the 
6
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OPTIMAL ASSET ALLOCATION IN RETIREMENT WITH OPEN-END 
REAL ESTATE FUNDS
Raimond Maurer  
Goethe University
Ralph Rogalla  
Goethe University
Yuanyuan Shen
Goethe University Figure 1: Morgan Stanley P2 Value – Trading prices and volumes 1/2008 to 12/2009
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assets and daily callable liabilities.
LIQUIDITY CRISIS
In 2005, the first liquidity crisis hit the 
OREF industry. Two major fund managers
had to suspend redemption of their units for
several months due to unexpectedly large
cash outflows. This first crisis was mostly
driven by fundamental reasons, i. e. investors
expected the depreciation of properties held
by the funds. In the wake of the global finan-
cial crisis, starting in October 2008, many
OREFs were forced to freeze redemptions 
as panicking German investors, particularly
large institutional investors, massively with-
drew funds. Some of those frozen funds even
had to substantially depreciate the value 
of their property portfolios. While investors
were not able to redeem units in frozen
funds at net asset value prices, they still 
had the opportunity to trade their fund
units through organized secondary mar-
kets, although at discounted and compara-
bly volatile prices (see Figure 1 for details
on one such OREF, the Morgan Stanley P2
Value fund).
IMPACT ON RETIREMENT PORTFOLIO CHOICE
We study the impact of the danger of OREFs
being frozen in the context of private
investors’ optimal portfolio selection. Taking
a shortfall risk approach in line with previous
studies on retirement portfolios (see Milevsky
et al. 2006), we analyze the asset allocation
implications of OREFs’ liquidity issues by com-
paring risk-efficient investment strategies for
withdrawal plans under three alternative price
dynamics for OREF units: first, where fund
units can at any time be surrendered for
redemption at net asset value; second, where
redemption may temporarily be suspended
and fund units may only be sold through 
secondary markets at a time-varying discount
on net asset value; and, third, where in addi-
tion to a possible freeze, unit prices may drop 
due to devaluation shocks. We derive the
Retirement Efficient Frontier (REF), which
quantifies the relation between the level of 
the monthly withdrawal rate and the proba-
bility of assets being exhausted during 
the retiree’s lifetime. We find that for low to
moderate periodic withdrawals, efficient
portfolios consist of up to 85% real estate
fund investments in case fund units are con-
tinuously redeemable. Moreover, we show
that, even if there is a monthly probability 
of 2.5% that redemption of fund units is 
temporarily suspended, the allocation into real
estate funds in risk-efficient portfolios is only
slightly affected. Yet, if funds additionally 
face a high risk of having to depreciate their
property portfolio during a liquidity crisis,
their share in efficient retirement portfolios 
is reduced significantly. (See Table 1 for the
LPoR and risk-minimizing OREF allocations
for the three alternative liquidity regimes.) 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our results have several implications relevant
to financial intermediaries designing products
for the payout phase of pension plans and to
professional financial planners helping clients
to make retirement investment choices.
OREFs can add value to the retirement 
portfolios of private investors and can be a 
reasonable part of drawdown products like
programmed withdrawal plans or investment-
linked payout annuities. Financial advisors 
as well as OREF managers should, howev-
er, increase awareness among investors that
OREFs are not virtually riskless. There is 
considerable selection risk when deciding
which OREF to invest in. 
REFERENCES
Milevsky, M., Moore, K., Young, V. (2006)
“Asset Allocation and Annuity-Purchase Strategies
to Minimize the Probability of Financial Ruin”,
Mathematical Finance, Vol. 16, pp. 647-671
The full article was published in Zeitschrift für
Betriebswirtschaft, Special Issue 1/2012 (on real
estate finance) and is available at: 
www.zfb-online.de/index.php?do=show&id=
21271&alloc=185&uid=&ip_id= 
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Table 1: LPoR and risk-minimizing OREF portfolio weights for alternative liquidity regimes
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
No fund freezes
LPoR 
(%)
Portfolio
weight (%)
0.00 85
0.01 70
0.08 60
0.53 40
1.16 5
2.10 0
4.43 0
Fund freezes
LPoR 
(%)
Portfolio
weight (%)
0.00 75
0.02 65
0.11 55
0.59 10
1.16 0
2.10 0
4.43 0
Fund freezes & 
devaluation shocks
LPoR 
(%)
Portfolio
weight (%)
0.01 25
0.06 20
0.18 0
0.59 0
1.16 0
2.10 0
4.43 0
Withdrawal
rate (%)
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T
he German version of often vexa-
tious and sometimes frivolous share-
holder suits is to challenge conclusions
taken by the majority of the shareholders
of public companies before the courts. 
To become effective, important decisions
like, for example, capital increases,
squeeze-outs, mergers etc., need the
approval of the shareholders and do not
become effective before registration in
the commercial register. If a shareholder
files a suit against such a decision taken
by the majority of shareholders, the regis-
trar will suspend the registration until
the civil court has decided on the merits
of the contesting action. Very frequently
however, these suits are settled by an
agreement between the plaintiff and 
the company, which will usually have a
strong interest that the measure becomes
effective without further delay. The 
settlement will provide for an indirect
and often lucrative compensation for 
the plaintiff. 
The German legislator has several times tried
to amend the respective rules in order to limit
the abuse of the hold-up situation created 
by the registration requirement. Legislative
interference in this area is difficult because
one does not want to destroy the incentives 
of investors to take justified actions and weak-
en the control of dominant shareholders and/
or the management by smaller investors. The
last amendment of the Stock Corporation Act
in this regard became effective in September
2009. One goal of this amendment was to
speed up the registration process when suits
with low chances of success have been tabled
or when the plaintiff asserts only minor
defects in the shareholders’ conclusion. We
have tried, following up on similar studies car-
ried out by us earlier, to analyze the develop-
ment of shareholder suits before and after the
enactment of the reform bill of 2009 and its
empirical effects.  
METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
We have conducted a complete, exhaustive
descriptive survey of all shareholder suits
against German public companies (with shares
traded on the regulated market) for the period
from July 2007 to July 2011. The data have
been collected from the (electronic) Official
Gazette, the (electronic) commercial registers
and the courts. Our main finding is that share-
holder suits have significantly decreased since
2009. This cannot however be traced back
solely to the reform bill of 2009. Economic
activities requiring shareholder approval
which then may be subject to contesting
actions also decreased during the period inves-
tigated. However, the percentage of suits
tabled by “frequent litigants” (as measured by
certain criteria) stayed at the same level.
Furthermore, the total number of frequent 
litigants increased. Within the group of the
“top 20 professional litigants” the settlement
amount was higher than 500,000 euros in
about 50% of cases. In our last study of 2007,
this had been the case for 73.2% of lawsuits. 
Looking at the type of resolutions that were
contested, one can see a significant increase 
in “discharge” decisions in the years 2007 
and 2008 (board members need to ask share-
holders for a formal discharge annually).
Thereafter, these figures decline again. The
number of suits against squeeze-outs and
reorganizations declined significantly relative
to the development of the total number of
SHAREHOLDER SUITS IN GERMAN COMPANY LAW – 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Theodor Baums
Goethe University
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claims, but increased relative to the frequency
of squeeze-outs and reorganizations. Looking
at the reasons for contesting action, alleged
infringements of the right to information
decreased. Non-compliance with reporting
duties has been asserted more frequently.
Moreover, the loss of the voting right of a
major shareholder because of his/her breach
of securities laws (a breach of reporting duties
regarding major holdings in listed companies)
is a frequent complaint. Violations of the
“comply or explain” rule under Section 161 of
the German Stock Corporation Act are also
put forward. 
Our findings show that the duration of law-
suits has decreased considerably since the
reform bill of 2009 came into force. Lawsuits
have ended with a settlement less often than
in the past. If a sentence is passed, the action
is dismissed in most cases (fully in 63% of
cases and partially in 17% of cases). The Stock
Corporation Act provides for an injunctive
relief allowing a shareholders’ conclusion to
be entered into the register before the civil
court has decided on the merits of the claim
made. The number of such preliminary actions
has decreased by half since 2009. On average,
injunctive reliefs can be obtained within 100
days of a petition being filed. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the reform bill of 2009 has shown a
significant effect, further reforms in this area
are still required. We recommend considering
the following amendments: 
1. The incentive for frequent litigations is the
(indirect) compensation in the case of a 
settlement. The plaintiff´s attorney and 
the plaintiff him/herself are remunerated
depending on the agreed “value” of the
settlement. This value should be subject to
a judicial review, precisely as it is being
reviewed and fixed by the court when the
judicial procedure concludes with the judi-
cial decision of the case.
2. The federal states of Germany are author-
ized to concentrate judicial competences in
company law matters. This could profes-
sionalize courts and speed up legal proce-
dures. Up until now, only a few states have
made use of this. We recommend taking
advantage of this opportunity.
3.  A further question is whether violations 
of notification requirements under the
Securities Trading Act should lead to the
loss of the voting right ipso iure. One pos-
sible solution could be that the Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)
would have to take a decision on that
before. An elegant solution would be to
require that the plaintiff holds a minimum
percentage of shares in the company con-
cerned. 
REFERENCES
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Figure 1: Selected economic activities requiring shareholder approval/suits 
Source: Baums/Drinhausen/Keinath (2011)
Year of 
shareholder 
meeting
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011 
(until July 31)
Squeeze-outs
57
35
38
32
30
24
27
22
9
Mergers/spin-
offs/changes 
of form
51
70
43
49
47
38
44
30
27
Group
agreements
179
137
145
189
187
231
173
170
127
Increase/
reduction of
stated capital
499
672
719
794
760
719
653
690
430
Shareholder
suits (mini-
mum figures)
135
172
281
357
403
554
286
162
66
Suits in % 
of listed 
transactions
17.2%
18.8%
29.7%
33.5%
39.3%
54.7%
31.8%
17.8%
11.1%
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n its decision of December 13, 2011, 
the Constitutional Court of the state 
of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) ruled
that a State Court of Auditors is granted
by the constitution a broad scope of pow-
ers not only to control the immediate
state administration but also entities out-
side the direct state administration, as far
as they exercise financial responsibility
for the state. This holds especially with
regard to banks organized under public
law, if their activities affect the state
budget. This is generally the case when
the state is liable for the obligations of
such an entity, be it by statutory law or 
by contracts. This ruling may have serious
implications for the capital guarantees
extended by EU Member States to the
newly established institutions on the
European level, as for instance the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
Governments frequently transfer some of their
tasks to third parties. Often, these third parties
will be legal entities that belong to the govern-
ment. This is especially true for legal entities
organized under public law, such as the 
majority of financial institutions in Germany.
Transferring tasks to an external entity leads 
to an effective loss of control and information.
This raises the question to what extent parlia-
ments and courts of auditors are constitution-
ally entitled to and maybe even obliged to
exercise guidance and control over these enti-
ties which basically remain an indirect part of
the administration.
Technically, the case was a dispute between
the NRW Court of Auditors as plaintiff and the
state government as defendant over the scope
of control of the state government. The state 
government was represented by the Minister
of Finance, as an agent of the state on the
board of the NRW.BANK and the Minister of
the Interior, as administrative supervisor of
the bank as an entity of administrative law.
Indirectly it was also disputed whether the
bank, like numerous other banks in Germany
which are organized more or less as govern-
ment entities (e.g. the Landesbanken and
almost all municipal savings banks), is subject
to the control by the Court of Auditors. 
THE RULING
The admissibility of the case already posed the
first problem: Does the Court of Auditors have
standing to sue the state government and 
its members in the Constitutional Court? The
answer had never been treated by a constitu-
tional court and cannot simply be derived from
the wording of the statutes. The decision thus
had to pave the way for new legal territory. 
As a result, the court took a clear stand and
affirmed at least for the state of North Rhine-
Westphalia: The constitution itself vests rights
and powers in the State Court of Auditors.
Therefore, it has standing in the Constitutional
Court of the state to argue these rights and
powers.
On the merits of the case, the court empha-
sized that the control exercised by the Court of
Auditors plays a crucial role for enabling the
parliament to discharge its budgetary responsi-
bilities. It comprises not only the immediate
budgetary process of the state, but also
includes a comprehensive control of measures
by other entities which have a direct or indi-
rect effect on state finances. The court argues
10
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CONSTITUTIONAL RULING ON COURT OF AUDITORS’ REVIEW OF BANKS
Helmut Siekmann*
Goethe University
Patrick Tuschl
Goethe University
*Professor Siekmann was counsel to the Court of Auditors and represented it in the Constitutional Court.
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ding right of control for the Court of Auditors is not
admissible from a constitutional point of view. 
Such a fiscal responsibility can be the result of
all business transactions of the NRW.BANK.
The state is directly liable for any deficit of the
bank and the Minister of Finance gave an
explicit guarantee on behalf of the state for
obligations of the bank. This has to be judged
in light of the volume of its balance sheet
which exceeds by far the state budget’s vol-
ume. This fiscal responsibility has to be consid-
ered alongside the loss of control on the side of
the parliament, because important decisions
that might substantially affect the state budget
are made by the bodies of the NRW.BANK.
Even though the Minister of Finance is a
member of the decision-making bodies of the
NRW.BANK, he refused to submit to the con-
trol of the Court of Auditors, as did the
Minister of the Interior. Incidentally, he also
refused to disclose details to the state legisla-
ture when it asked for them.
In view of the ongoing crisis of the banking
system, the court’s stance on other means of
control which are applied on the bank is espe-
cially interesting. It rejected plainly the argu-
ment of the government, that the activities of
the bank are sufficiently controlled by
accountants and the general banking supervi-
sion by the Bundesbank and the (federal)
financial services authority (BaFin). According
to the decision, the scope of the information
and supervision rights vested in the Court of
Auditors is generally unlimited and is deter-
mined only by the Court of Auditors itself and
not by the controlled entities.
OUTLOOK
The court’s ruling will result, in the first place,
in a comprehensive control of the NRW.BANK
itself, but might also be extended to other 
bodies with budgetary responsibilities. Judging
from the developments of the last years, this
decision can be interpreted as evidence for
potential constitutional supervision and con-
trol duties in the case of implicit guarantees for
financial institutions; an important question
for the responsibilities that governments took
on for the banking sector in the past.
The full article is available at: 
www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_platform/
Ruling_on_Banks_Review
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“INFORMATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO UNDERSTANDING”
Michael S. Barr, Professor at the Uni  ver  sity
of Michigan Law School, conducts re  search
on financial regulation and financial
services. From 2009 to 2010 he served as
Assistant Secretary for Financial Insti  tu  -
tions at the US Department of the
Treasury and was a key architect of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. On January 20,
he gave a speech at the IMFS/LEMF-
Retail Finance Conference at the House
of Finance (see p. 14)
Prof. Barr, in your research, you distinguish
between regulation by changing procedural
rules versus regulation by scoring. Can you
please elaborate on this? 
A behavioral perspective allows one to account
better for how individuals make decisions and
is thus a useful corrective to the rational-agent
model. At the same time, a framework is re  quired
that takes into account firms’ incentives with
respect to individual behavior. The psychological
biases of individuals can be either aligned with
or opposed to the interest of firms that market
products or services to them. When firms have
incentives to overcome a psychological bias, as
for example in the context of saving, regulation
can take the form of rule changes, such as
changing the starting point or default. For exam-
ple, workers can automatically be signed up for
a retirement saving plan unless they opt out.
When firms have incentives to keep the bias in
place, for example, in forcing disclosure of
hidden or contingent prices of credit, the regu  -
lator often faces non-cooperative firms, whose
interests are to find ways to undo interven-
tions. In that instance, the regulator may need
to change the scoring of the game, by increas-
ing liability to offset the gains to 
the firm from engaging in the disfavored activ-
ity. Typically, changing the rules of the game
(without changing the scoring) maintains 
the firms’ original incentives to help or hurt
consumer bias, while changing the scoring of
the game can alter those incentives.
As a reaction to the financial crisis, the US leg-
islation aims to provide financial consumers
with more information. Does more informa-
tion always lead to more rational behavior?
More information is not always better. The
amount of information people can and do
attend to is limited. Moreover, to the extent that
consumers find themselves in challenging situa-
tions that are unfamiliar, distracting, or tense, all
of which consume cognitive resources, less
focused attention will be available to process the
information that is relevant to the decision at
hand. This, in turn, can render decision-making
even more dependent on situational cues and
peripheral considerations. Information does not
necessarily lead to understanding, nor under-
standing necessarily to behavior. 
The Dodd-Frank Act sets a huge amount of new
rules. In Europe, we found that often there is
no lack of rules but rather a lack of obedience
to these rules. What makes you confident that
the new legislation will bring better results?
The US had gaping holes in our system of reg-
ulation and supervision that permitted the
financial sector to become over-leveraged,
opaque, and risky. Regulatory reforms will
now permit the financial sector to rebuild on 
a firmer foundation. At the same time, one
needs to be humble about the ability to predict
future crises, and one needs to remain vigilant
about implementation, supervision and enfor  -
cement under the new framework.
Michael S. Barr  
University of 
Michigan Law School
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On January 20 and 21, the Institute for Monetary
and Financial Stability (Prof. Roman Inderst) and
the Doctorate/Ph.D. Program Law and Eco  no  mics
of Money and Finance (Prof. Brigitte Haar) held a
conference on retail financial services. A panel dis-
cussion on policy questions with regulatory experts from the European Commission (Jacqueline
Minor, Director of Consumer Affairs), the BaFin (Michael Sell, Executive Director), the FSA (Peter
Edmonds, Risk Division), the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection
(Christian Grugel, Head of Department), and a bank representative (Martin Krebs, Executive Board,
ING-DiBa) provided for a lively kick-off. Thereafter, the leading researchers in European capital
market law and finance – such as, on the law side, Michael Barr (Michigan Law), Niamh Moloney
(London School of Economics), Susanne Kalss (Vienna University of Economics and Business) and,
on the finance side, Mark Armstrong (Oxford), Luigi Guiso (European University Institute), Paul
Heidhues (ESMT), and Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi) – explored the foundations of investor and con-
sumer protection and their implementation in regulatory practice in stimulating presentations of
their research findings to a large number of interested participants from all over Germany.
NEWS IN BRIEF
• The House of Finance has started a page on
Facebook. If you are interested in more
frequent information about the House of
Finance, please visit www.facebook.com/
houseoffinance.
• The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)
has assigned a grant to Holger Kraft as prin-
cipal investigator. His research team will work
on the project “Life-Cycle Consumption-
Portfolio Choice with Housing: Borrowing
Constraints and Incompleteness”.
• Thomas Kaiser has been appointed Hono  rary
Professor at the Department of Finance. Kaiser,
Director at KPMG Germany, is offering lectures
and seminars about risk management.
• The first musical held at the House of Finance
was a great success: from 27 to 29 January,
about 550 visitors came to the House of Finance
to see “Euro Crash”, an entertaining and
thought-provoking musical written by David
Shirreff (a correspondent for “The Economist”),
with a score composed by Russell Sarre.
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THOMAS LAUBACH TO ADVISE
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
Thomas Laubach, who has been
Professor for Macroeconomics at
the House of Finance since April
2008, will be starting a new job
at the Federal Reserve Board in
Washington DC in February 2012.
He will become a Senior Advisor in the Research
and Statistics Division. His responsibilities will
include providing advice and support to the Board
of Governors chaired by Ben S. Ber  nanke as well
as the Federal Open Market Com  mittee (FOMC).
Current topics of interest include the FOMC’s
communications strategy and the connection
between interest rate policy and financial stability.
Before coming to Goethe University, Laubach
had already worked at the Fed for eight years, at
the end as Senior Economist. Laubach obtained
his Ph.D. at Princeton University in 1997, with
Ben Bernanke acting as his thesis advisor. 
ACKERMANN, STEINBRÜCK AND ISSING AT THE OPEN SEMINAR
What lies at the heart of the current European
financial crisis – deficiencies in the banking sector
or excessive government debt and political mis-
management? This question was discussed by
Josef Ackermann, the departing head of Deutsche
Bank, Peer Steinbrück, a former Federal Minister of Finance and a key figure in Germany’s SPD
party, and Otmar Issing, the President of the CFS and former chief economist of the ECB, togeth-
er with academic scholars in Berlin on December 15. The Open Seminar was organized by the
House of Finance, the European School of Management and Technology and the Hertie School
of Governance. A major point of discussion was whether or not the banking sector should incur
liability for credit defaults. The legitimacy of political decisions is being confronted by urgent refi-
nancing needs. Representatives of the institutions behind the event, including Prof. Helmut
Siekmann from the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability at the House of Finance,
enriched the discussion with well-founded and original explanatory approaches.
CHRISTIAN SCHLAG ELECTED
TO A DFG REVIEW BOARD
Christian Schlag, Professor of
De  rivatives and Financial Engi  -
ne  ering at the House of Finance,
has been elected to the Review
Board for Business Admi  ni  stra  -
tion of the Deutsche For  schungs  -
gemeinschaft (DFG, the German Research
Foundation). One of the main tasks of review
board members, who serve in an honorary
capacity, is to ensure the overall quality of the
DFG’s review process. 
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QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
Thursday, 24
th Conference  
9 am – 5.30 pm “Corporate Finance Summit 2012”  
Organization: Institute for Law and Finance in
cooperation with Commerzbank
Tuesday, 29
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm Speaker: Lorenzo Gerlappi, 
University of British Columbia
JUNE
Monday, 4
th EFL Jour Fixe  
5 pm “Security Risks of Cloud Computing in
Financial Services”  
Speaker: Olga Wenge, Deutsche Bank
Tuesday, 5
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm Speaker: Magnus Dahlquist, 
Stockholm School of Economics
Wednesday, 6
th ILF Panel Discussion  
6 pm – 10 pm “Infrastruktur, Recht und Finanzen”  
Tuesday, 12
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm Speaker: Amit Goyal, University of Lausanne
Thursday, 14
th House of Finance Brown Bag Seminar  
12 pm Speaker: Volker Wieland, Goethe University
Tuesday, 19
th ILF Breakfast Series
8 am – 10 am
Tuesday, 26
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm Robert Kosowski, Imperial College London
Please refer to www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/eventlist.html
for continuous updates of the event calendar.
Please note that for some events registration is compulsory.
APRIL
Tuesday, 3
rd ILF Breakfast Series 
8 am – 10 am “Mittelstandsthemen der Anwaltschaft”
Wednesday, 4
th ILF Panel Discussion
6 pm – 10 pm  “Infrastruktur, Recht und Finanzen”
Thursday, 12
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 pm  Speaker: Barbara Rossi, Duke University
Tuesday, 24
th Finance Seminar 
5.15 pm Speaker: Mathijs A. van Dijk, 
Rotterdam School of Management
Tuesday, 24
th  Conference 
9 am – 5.30 pm “Islamic Banking and Finance”
Organization: Institute for Law and Finance in
cooperation with Clifford Chance & Institute
for Islamic Banking and Finance
Wednesday, 25
th ILF Breakfast Series
8 am – 10 am “Mittelstandsthemen der Anwaltschaft”
Thursday, 26
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 pm Speaker: Berthold Herrendorf, 
Arizona State University
Thursday, 26
th IMFS Distinguished Lecture
5.30 pm Speaker: Choongsoo Kim, 
Governor of the Bank of Korea
MAY
Thursday, 3
rd House of Finance Brown Bag Seminar
12 pm “Who Benefits from Building Insurance
Groups? A Welfare Analysis based on
Optimal Group Risk Management”  
Speaker: Helmut Gründl, Goethe University
Thursday, 3
rd ILF Conference   
9 am – 5.30 pm “The Crisis Management Directive:
Europe’s Solution for Too Big to Fail?”  
Friday, 4
th ILF Panel Discussion and Dinner 
3 pm – 12 pm “10 years Celebration”
Saturday, 5
th ILF Alumni Event
8 am – 6 pm “10 years Celebration”
Monday, 7
th EFL Jour Fixe
5 pm “Supporting Intraday Investment
Decisions Using Text Mining and
Sentiment Analysis”
Speaker: Michael Siering
Tuesday, 8
th Finance Seminar 
5.15 pm Speaker: Fabio Trojani, University of Lugano
Tuesday, 22
nd Finance Seminar
5.15 pm Speaker: Mark Schroder, 
Michigan State University
Tuesday, 22
nd ILF Breakfast Series 
8 am – 10 am “Mittelstandsthemen der Anwaltschaft”
Thursday, 24
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 pm Speaker: Michelle Rendall, University of Zurich
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